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The military services are utilizing service contracting
to alleviate the problems of personnel ceilings drawdowns and
tight budgetary controls. Due to poor definition of the State-
ment of Work and a general misunderstanding of OMB Circular
J
A-76 and a liberal interpretation of the Service Contract Act
by the Department of Labor, service contracting and the ad-
ministration of service contracts must be considered poor.
Recent attempts by the Navy and Air Force through their COTR
and TRCO concepts to alleviate some of the problems in ser-
vice contract administration have had varied results.
This thesis will examine the problems that presently
hinder service contracting and the administration of service
contracts. A new approach, job analysis, will be recommended
for developing the Statement of Work and the Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan. Job analysis involves systematic analysis
of the function to be contracted. First a step-by-step re-
view of the requirement to be contracted is conducted. The
goal of this review is to arrive at specific output services
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I. INTRODUCTION
Upon receipt of a purchase request the procuring con-
tracting officer must determine if a competitive base
exists. If there are an adequate number of qualified sup-
pliers who will be actively competing for the contract,
the contractors are willing to price competitively, definite
specifications can be published for the required items, and
there is adequate time for the formalities incident to ad-
vertising, reception, and opening of bids, then formal adver-
tising is the preferred method of procurement. If any of the
formal advertising criteria cannot be met, procurement must
be made by negotiation, provided that the procurement situa-
tion is covered by one of seventeen exceptions cited in the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. A further restriction
on the authority of the contracting officer is included in
several of the statutory exceptions to formal advertising that
requires a determination by the head of the department prior
to negotiation. In 10 United States Code 2304 (g) all nego-
tiated procurements in excess of $10,000.00 in which rates
or prices are not fixed by law or regulation and in which
time of delivery will permit, proposals, including price,
shall be solicited from the maximum number of qualified
sources consistent with the nature and requirements of the
supplies or services to be procured and written or oral dis-
cussions shall be conducted with all responsible offerors

who submit proposals within a competitive range, price and
other factors considered. The requirements of this subsection
are with respect to written or oral discussions and need not
be applied to procurements in implementation of authorized
set-aside programs or to procurements where it can be clearly
demonstrated from the existence of adequate competition or
accurate prior cost experience with the product, that accep-
tance of an initial proposal without discussion would result
in fair and reasonable prices. The request for proposal
must notify all offerors of the possibility that award may
be made without discussions.
Proposals from the qualified sources should be quanti-
tatively evaluated and may be ranked in accordance with their
point scores. Narrative comments would be included indicating
individual proposal strengths and weaknesses . The over-
riding consideration is to make the award to the firm that
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Government that it
can perform in the best interest of the Government, price and
other factors considered. This is the competitive range de-
cision and must involve careful cost/quality analysis based
on judgment and on circumstances to each individual procure-
ment. The contracting officer is therefore presented with a
Paul A. Shnitzer, "Competitive Negotiation, Basic
Principles and Guidelines," (The Government Contractor,
BRIEFING PAPERS, August 1975), pp. 1-2.

flexible working definition for determining the competitive
range, and procurement should result which is fair and equita-
2ble to the parties involved.
The Government cannot contract for services for people who
receive their assignment from Government personnel, and whose
relationship to the Government is no different from that of a
Government employee. If the Government desires to procure
services in this fashion, it must hire its personnel in ac-
cordance with Civil Service Laws. The contract must be for a
finished end product and be administered to insure that con-
trol and supervision over the work, and discretion as to the
techniques which will be used, remain entirely with the con-
3tractor.
By Office of Management and Budget Circular A-7 6 a na-
tional policy was established to rely on the private enter-
prise system for the products and services needed by the Gov-
ernment to the maximum extent consistent with effective ac-
complishment of essential programs. OMB Circular A-7 6 exempts
basic functions of management which agencies must perform in
order to retain essential control over the conduct of their
programs and management advisory services normally provided
2 Duby, Martin G., "Working Definition of Competitive
Range," Government Contracts Service, October 1971, p. F-18
"Proper Use of Contractor Personnel," SECNAVINST
4200. 27A, Department of the Navy, 23 June 1976, p. 1.

by government staff organizations. The problem here is to
determine which services fall under A-7 6 and those that do
not. The armed services generally divide these into the
following:
1. Expert and consultant services (personal ser-
vices) , i.e., support services performed by personnel who are
exceptionally qualified, by education or experience, in a
particular field to perform some specialized service.
2. Contractor support services (nonpersonal ser-
vices) , i.e., support services of a white collar, professional
nature, involving performance in support of Navy programs,
such as scientific/technical studies and analysis, test and
evaluation support, budgetary/financial analysis, ADP support,
reliability and maintainability support, cost analysis, and
general management support.
3. Commercial or Industrial (C/I) Activities Sup-
port Services (nonpersonal services), i.e., overhead or pro-
gram support services not essential to the management control
of Navy programs. Essentially, the blue collar area, such
as janitorial, transportation, or guard services. C/I Acti-
vities Program calls for contracting out of entire functions
or the total capability by contract. Contractor support ser-
vices involve contracting out specific efforts in support of
a continuing in-house capability.
4 LCDR P. S. Cole, "Contracting Out," Procurement News-
letter (Summer 1977), p. 7.

Other service contracts covered by the Service Contract
Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-286) include services for such areas as
laundry and dry cleaning, general services, food services,
custodial and janitorial duties, packing and crating and
miscellaneous housekeeping functions in excess of $2500.00.
The Service Contract Act extends Federal minimum wage, fringe
benefits, and working condition standards to all contracts
and subcontracts thereunder for all these services but adds
nothing in determining their competitive range.
Other examples of service contracts would be those calling
for repairs to certain machinery where the precise work to be
done cannot be predicted in advance, such as a time and mate-
rial contract. Another would be where the materials are not
supplied by the seller, but costs are agreed to, this being a
labor hour contract. Also included are level of effort ser-
vice contracts where the Government desires a certain general
scope of work to be performed, the contractor may be able or
not able to deliver the requested performance.
Service contracts have been and will continue to be an
ever increasing focal point for the courts, General Accounting
Office, and Congress. The reasons include the aforementioned
OMB Circular A-7 6, labor unions representing Government em-
ployees that feel civil service jobs are being threatened,
and the President's transfer of responsibility for several
procurement policy functions from OMB to General Services
Administration. Most controversies in the service contract
arena surround the personal versus non-personal distinction.
If the Government tells the contractor how, not what to do,
10

the contract becomes the illegal personal service and no
longer a non-personal service.
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Department of Defense operates some 8 00 major and
5000 minor installations and activities around the world.
With the continuing drawdown on resources, the various branches
of the armed services are faced with serious challenges to
support themselves. Increased emphasis and direction from
higher echelons is continually being received by the armed
services to expand the amount of service contracting now
being done.
The most apparent problem with the increased emphasis on
contracting out by the armed services is the apparent weakness
of ill definition of requirements and consequent inability to
measure true performance. This paper will examine present
methods of identifying and stating service requirements so
that a contract will accurately express the minimum essential
requirements and associated measurable characteristics. In
addition, present methods will be examined and possible solu-
tions will be offered to contracting personnel to assure that
proper contract administration is being performed, and the
contractor is providing the contractually required services.
Joseph J. Duffy, Jr., "Service Contracts - Crossover
from Non-personal to Personal, Some Criteria," Procurement




Research material was gathered and discussions held with
a myriad of personnel involved in the service contracting
sphere. Research for applicable articles and studies per-
taining to all aspects of service contracting was conducted.
Information was obtained from the Library of the Naval Post-
graduate School, the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Center, Fort Lee, Virginia, the Library of the Federal Pro-
curement Institute, Washington, D.C., and the Air University
at Maxwell Air Force Base.
Telephone discussions with procurement personnel from
the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, and the Air Force
Logistics Management Center, provided considerable input into
new approaches to service contracting by the Air Force.
Field trips to the Navy Procurement Office, Oakland,
California, the base procurement office, Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base, Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, and the Navy
Supply Systems Command provided this author a view of not
only the procurement personnel's day-to-day problems, but
also policy pronouncements by higher authority. The field
trips also provided a chance to observe two methods utilized
by the armed services to administer service contracts. The
Navy's concept, COTR, or Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative, and the Air Force's TRCO, or Technical
12

Representative of the Contracting Officer, were observed
in theory or practice, respectively.
This thesis will introduce the reader to the problems
that the military services are encountering today in service
contracting. Past practices, General Accounting Office deci-
sions, current laws, directives, and procedures that have a
bearing on service contracting will be viewed in order to put
service contracting into perspective. The problems with ser-
vice contracting will be identified and then an analysis of
suggested methods of developing a service contract will be
explored.
This author hypothesized that the armed services do a
poor job in the service contracting arena. It was also hypo-
thesized that the various armed services would attack service
contracting from totally different perspectives, i.e., the
Air Force being very centralized in their management of the
service contract problem, the Navy very decentralized, and
the Army somewhere in between.
It was anticipated that at least a few recommendations
would be possible. The various approaches used in preparing
and administering service contracts to improve the process






This section will provide the reader with background
information into the basic acts, laws, and decisions that
have had a decisive factor in determining the competitive
range, selecting a source and negotiating with that source
for a service type contract.
The Service Contract Act of 1965 effective 19 January
1966 extended Federal minimum wage, fringe benefits and work-
ing condition standards, to all contracts and subcontracts
thereunder for services, such as laundry and dry cleaning,
guard services, food services, custodial and janitorial duties,
packing and crating, and miscellaneous. housekeeping functions,
in excess of $2500.00. The law specifies that service con-
tracts in excess of $2500.00 must require that the contractor
pay his employees the prevailing wage rate for the locality
as determined by the Secretary of Labor, including fringe
benefits as an element of wages. Successor contractors are
required to pay wage rates and fringe benefits based on those
agreed to by the predecessor contractors in collective bargain-
ing agreements when the new service contracts is for substan-
tially the same work and will be performed at the same location.
In no case can the wage rate be less than that provided under
the Fair Labor Standards Acts. In addition to its wage rate
provisions, the law also covers safety standards and sanitary
working conditions.
The Service Contract Act of 1965, Government Contracting
Reports, Revision 26, Part II, p. H-4-14.
1 A

Because of the broad and somewhat ambiguous definition of
a service employee, there have been difficulties in determining
whether the Act is applicable to a given situation. Clear
examples of the proper application of the Act were previously
mentioned. However, a service employee is not one who quali-
fies as a bona fide executive, administrative or professional
employee.
The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act applies to United
States contracts for the manufacture or furnishing of materials,
supplies, articles and equipment, in any amount of over $10,000.
The Service Contract Act applies to all United States con-
tracts, the principal purpose in which is to furnish services
through service employees. In a modification, overhaul type
contract where supplies and services are being furnished in
substantial amounts, it will be necessary for the contractor
to comply with the provisions of both laws.
gThe following represent categories of services contracts
:
1. Maintenance, overhaul, repair, servicing, re-
habilitation, salvage, and modernization or modification of
supplies, systems, and equipment.
2. Maintenance, repair, rehabilitation, and modi-
fication of real property.
3. Architect-engineering.
4. Expert and consultant services.
5. The services of DOD-sponsored organizations.
7
The Service Contract Act of 1965, op.cit., p. H-4-18.
p
Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 197 6 Edition,
Department of Defense, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Section XXII.
15

6. Installation of equipment obtained under separate
contract.
7. Operation of Government-owned equipment, facili-
ties and systems.
8. Engineering and technical services.
9. Housekeeping and base services.
10. Transportation and related services.
11. Training and education.
12. Medical services.









22* Research and development.
Government purchases are customarily made through pro-
curement by formal advertising and negotiation. The evalua-
tion and selection procedures in formal advertising are the
more orderly, systematic and objective. They consist of a
bidder's submission of sealed bids, a public opening and
award (without any type of discussion) to the responsible
bidder submitting the lowest responsive bid.
16

Procurement by negotiation, as the alternative, is
characterized by a subjective evaluation process. Negotia-
tion affords the Government a considerable amount of flexibi-
lity and permits the consideration of factors that would be
ignored in formal advertising. Negotiation also requires
more knowledge and insight by the contracting officer than
is needed in formal advertising. These factors are very evi-
dent in the case of a competitive negotiation (as opposed to
a sole source negotiated procurement) which is frequently as
9highly contested as one that xs formally advertised.
Before proceeding with the procedures of determining the
competitive range for service type contracts the contracting
officer must examine the nature of the contractual relationship
that may develop. Questions must be raised as to whether a
request from a requiring activity will develop into a contract
of the legitimate non-personal services variety, or for an
illegal personal services. The Armed Services Procurement
Regulation requires that before a contracting officer enters
into a service contract, a written determination must be made
that the services are nonpersonal. A service contract is
personal and illegal when the relationship between the Gov-
ernment and the contractor's personnel is that of employer
and employee or when the "master-servant" relationship exists.
The Government must buy some sort of end item, not necessarily
9Schnitzer, op. cit.
, p. 1.
"Proper Use of Contractor Personnel," op. cit., p. 2.
17

hardware in the case of service contracts, but at least a
contractually specified and defined piece of research or a
report for example. If the Government wishes nothing more than
people who possess certain qualifications, then it must hire
them in accordance with the Civil Service laws. The furnish-
ing by the Government of office space, equipment or supplies,
and the interchange&bility of Government and contractor per-
sonnel will result in an illegal personal services contract.
When the contracting officer makes the decision to utilize
competitive negotiation, the Government initiates a Request
for Proposal (RFP) which sets out both the Government's re-
quirements and the criteria for evaluation of offers. This
is followed by the submission of timely proposals by a maxi-
mum number of possible offerors in the competitive range, and
ends with award of a contract to the one whose offer is most
12
advantageous to the Government.
In preparing the RFP the contracting agency must give
the Department of Labor thirty days notice, if possible, for
any contract exceeding $10,000.00 subject to the Service Con-
tract Act, specifying the types of service, the place of per-
formance, the number and class of employees and the minimum
wage and fringe benefits included in the contract.
Duffy, op. cit., p. 10.
12 Schmtzer, op. cit., p. 1,
18

The Office of Special Wage Standards, Employment Stan-
dards Administration of the Department of Labor will then
establish minimum monetary wages and specify fringe benefits
for various classes of service employees. This information
will then be forwarded back to the contracting officer. The
contracting officer must include the wages and fringe benefit
information received from the Department of Labor in the in-
vitation for bid (IFB) or request for proposal (RFP) for
subsequent use by the contractor.
In determining the competitive range (as discussed in
the introduction) in service type contracts, the Department
of Defense policy is to guard against unrealistically low
priced offers, and prohibit the use of auction techniques,
and technical transfusion. DOD regulations require identi-
fication and discussions of a contractor's proposed deficiencies
as well as discussions of cost proposals submitted. Practices
implementing the regulations have been criticized as leading
to undesirable results in awarding negotiated contracts. The
complaints centered on technical transfusion or so-called
levelling of contractor technical approaches and auction
techniques and buy-in. The procurement decision was too
often guided in source selection by the lowest quoted price
rather than a determination of which contractors can do the
14best overall job for the Government at a reasonable price.
The Service Contract Act of 1965, op.cit., p. H-4-13.
14





In an attempt to reduce the impacts of the technical
levelling and buy-ins, mentioned above, the Air Force intro-
duced a new approach' in 197 4 for performance of advanced, en-
gineering, or operational system development other than minor
developmental efforts. The process was separated into four
discrete chronological steps
:
1. Submission and discussion of technical proposals
2. Submission and discussion of cost or price
proposals.
3. Thorough evaluation of proposals for all rating
factors, including cost and fee, resulting in selection of a
contractor for final negotiation of a definitive contract.
4. Negotiation and execution of a definitive contract,
The process was to notify offerors that any proposals that
were unrealistic in terms of technical or schedule commitments
or unrealistically low in cost or price would be deemed reflec-
tive of an inherent lack of technical competence or indicative
of failure to comprehend the complexity and risks of contract
requirement, and may be grounds for rejection of the proposal.
To overcome the problem of technical leveling, contracting
officers were to confine their technical discussions with the
offerors to deficiencies in the proposal to those:
1. That lead the contracting officer to conclude
that the meaning of some aspect of the proposal is not clear.
Dale R. Babione, "Service Test of the Four Step Source
Selection Process," Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (4 March 197 6) , Attachment.
20

2. That fail to adequately substantiate a proposed
technical approach or solution
3. That lead the contracting officer to conclude that
further clarification of the intent of the solicitation is re-
quired to effect competition on an equal basis.
To mitigate against the possibility of inadvertent leak-
ing of competitor's cost estimates, as well as to remove pos-
sibility of successive rounds of negotiation (auction technique)
,
the submission of cost/price proposals would be delayed until
after evaluation of technical proposals and discussion of
technical deficiencies. The discussions would include:
1. Cost realism of an offeror's proposal
2. Rectification and/or accommodation of inconsis-
tencies or mathematical errors
3. Correlation of elements of cost with their
respective technical efforts
4. Discussion necessary to insure a complete under-
standing of Government requirements and what is being offered,
including delivery schedules and other contract terms.
Based on a complete evaluation of all important factors
including cost and fee, involving an integrated decision
considering the technical approach, capability, management,
price/cost and other factors, a contractor would be selected
1
6
J. W. Plummer, "Concept Paper on Alternate Method for
Awarding Competitive Negotiated Contracts for Advanced, Engi-





who is expected to do the best overall job for the Government.
Final negotiations are then held only with the selected offeror.
In the event that material changes occur and are desired by the
Government, negotiations will be reopened. Additional proposals
or revisions would not be authorized unless approved at a level
17
no lower than the Head of a Procuring Activity.
The contracting officer must be concerned with the in-
creased attention being centered on service type contracts. By
memorandum of 24 July 197 0, President Ford set forth for the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, the objective of increasing the
contracting out of the overhead or program functions (Commer-
cial or Industrial Activities Support Services mentioned in
the introduction) in accordnace with OMB Circular A-7 6. How-
ever, by memorandum of 12 May 1977, President Carter expressed
concern with the excessively large volume of personal and non-
personal consulting and expert services used by the Federal
Government. The problem for the contracting officer is to
identify which services fall under the A-7 6 program and which
can be identified as basic management advisory services which
are exempt from the A-7 6 program. Three active forces need
to be considered. One, the policy of the Government to ob-
tain services from private industry whenever practicable (OMB
Circular A-7 6); two, labor unions representing Government
employees which may take the position that civil service jobs
are being unduly threatened; and three, the President's transfer
17 Ibid., p. 4.
22

of responsibility for several important procurement policy
functions, including implementation of OMB Circular A-7 6
from the Office of Management and Budget to the General Ser-
18
vices Administration.
Surprisingly, most complaints on service type contracting
do not result from the manner in which the contract is written.
Government control or direction of contractor personnel is
the problem most often cited. The issue is the distinction
between surveillance, which is proper, and supervision, which
is not. The permissible range of dialogue between the Govern-
ment and the contractor is defined as whatever liaison and
discussion is necessary to carry out the traditional processes
of contract administration. In service type contracts, per-
sonnel are usually assigned in liaison capacity to keep the
Government advised of progress and surveillance, and as a con-
tact for the contractor to relay his questions and problems.
Prodding, reminding, policing written terms of the contract
is surveillance; however, how to perform the contract is the
contractor's responsibility. Government personnel perform
supervision when the contractor is told to perform in a cer-
tain manner. The contract than transforms into one for per-
19
sonal services. If the Government furnishes the type of
things an employer ordinarily provides his own employees, like
typing paper, an inference may be drawn that the Government is
treating the contractor's employees as its own.
18 Cole, "Contracting Out," op. cit., p. 7
19 Duffy, op. cit., p. 10.
23

III. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Manpower constraints caused by budgetary actions place more
importance on service contracting. Service contracting can
provide an alternative to the armed services accomplishment.
This alternative is accomplished by utilizing private con-
tractors in cases where in-house capabilities do not exist
or are too costly.
If millions of dollars are to be saved by contracting
out, then the identification of requirements and the reduc-
tion of those requirements into meaningful specifications
is essential for a successful contractual action. The Armed
Services Procurement Regulations' (ASPR) guidance for service
contracts can be found in Section XXII: "a service contract
is one that calls directly for a contractor's time and effort
rather than for a concrete end product." The inability to
require a measure of time and effort has greatly contributed
to difficulties in work definition and specifications. Vague
specifications and poorly defined evaluation criteria have
caused contractors to incorrectly perceive requirements, not
submit responsive proposals, and perform to the satisfaction
of the contracting activity. These factors have increased
unsatisfactory contractor performance, disputes, protests,
2
and claims due to misinterpretation of requirements.
20
L. R. Hawkins, "A Discriminative Study of the Effec-
tiveness of Service Contracting," Army Logistics Management
Center, Florida Institute of Technology, June 1977, p. 6.
24

The definition of a work or task requirement continues
to be an enormous problem. The statement of work is the vital
cog in communicating to potential contractors the Govern-
ment's needs, and measuring that performance through a sur-
veillance plan. When performance is less than desired, the
DOD community is subject to severe criticism, poor contract
administration, higher costs, and degradation of policies
21
specified in OMB Circular A-76.
The matters that procurement personnel must fully com-
prehend are the latest laws and regulations with regard to
service contracts, and then the key function of actually de-
fining the requirements and carrying the process to completion
with proper administration. An indepth discussion of contract
services, new applications and ramifications of the Service
Contract Act follows in the next section.
A. PROBLEMS WITH SERVICE CONTRACTS
The Employment Standards Administration of the Department
of Labor as a result of recent inquiries determined that cer-
tain contracts of the Naval Material Command did not contain
an appropriate Service Contract Act clause (ASPR 7-1903 . 41 (a)
)
and an applicable wage determination. The Office of General
Counsel believes that the omission of the Service Contract
Act clause and wage determinations in service contracts is






to Navy field offices that if 51 percent of the work under a
contract is for supplies then the Walsh-Healey Act applies,
unless the contract has two clearly severable phases, one
supply and the other services, in which case the Service
Contract Act applies to the services portion. The Service
Contract Act later was held to apply to a contract for archi-
tectural and engineering services contract although only 16
percent of the work was subject to the Service Contract Act.
With this liberal interpretation, it is now anticipated that
very few service contracts will not be applicable to the
Service Contract Act. If the contracting officer is in doubt
concerning the applicability of the Service Contract Act, a
Standard Form 98 should be forwarded to the Department of
22Labor for determination.
The Service Contract Act provides against "wage busting"
for blue collar workers. In October 197 6 amendments to the
Service Contract Act brought clerical and other white collar
workers within the definition of a "service employee." The
law requires that the contractor must pay its employees the
wages and fringe benefits prevailing in the area when contract-
ing with the federal government. Congress recently attempted
to include professional employees of federal contractors in
the Service Contract Act. Before the House Labor Committee
22 William G. Rae, "Service Contract Act Application,"
Department of the Navy, Office of the General Counsel, 21
March 1978, pp. 1-2.
26

completed debate as to whether professionals are victims of
cutthroat competition, OMB ' s Office of Federal Procurement
Policy issued a policy letter to federal agencies. In this
policy letter (No. 78-2) federal agencies were given directions
for preventing "wage busting" for professional employees of
federal contractors. The new policy, effective 1 April 1978,
provides that all future solicitations shall include the lang-
uage contained in the Policy Letter whenever professional em-
ployees are expected to be needed to perform the services.
The contracting officer can use the information provided by
the contractors from the proposed solicitations as to the
23
applicability of the policy letter to professional employees.
Another serious problem of the Service Contract Act in-
volves successor contracts. The Act requires that when the
Government awards a successor contract for work previously
under contract, the successor contract has to pay the employees
at least as much in wages and fringe benefits as contained in
the predecessor's collective bargaining contract. The Depart-
ment of Labor extended the provision to all continuing require-
ments for services even though the work might be performed in
different locations. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
wants the successorship provision applied only in circumstances
where substantially the same servcies are to be performed at
the same location as the previous contract. The Office of
23 Contract Services: OFPP Issues Policy on Preventing




Federal Procurement Policy contends the existing labor policy
acts to restrain competition for those service contracts
where the Government does not specify a place of performance.
If the location of performance is immaterial to the procuring
agency the actual location of performance may be unknown un-
til a successful bidder is selected. The Department of Labor
requires the minimum wage determination be based on the rates
24
applicable to the area where the procurement is located.
The Service Contract Act and OMB Circular A-7 6 are to a
great extent intertwined. OMB Circular A-76 requires a com-
parative cost analysis prior to issuance of service contracting
to determine if functions can be performed at less cost to the
Government "in-house" than under a service contract. Executive
agencies must make a comparative cost analysis between com-
mercial and Government sources , and the cost to be incurred
under each alternative must be determined in accordance with
OMB Circular A-7 6. Industry spokesmen have long complained
that cost factors used by the Government for its personnel when
making this determination as to whether the function should be
performed in-house or under contract are generally grossly un-
25
realistic and understated. A longtime seven percent cost
factor retirement cost factor generally had been used in
24
"Contract Services: OFPP Current Labor Department
Regs, Proposes Revised Policies for Government Agencies Under
SCA," Federal Contracts Report, 1-31-77, p. A-15.
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"Contract Services: OMB Proposes Sharp Rise in Cost
Factors on Retirement, Insurance for Cost Comparison," Federal




making comparisons of in-house versus contracting out for the
procurement decision. Recent studies suggested as high as 3
percent for the retirement cost figure, but 0MB initiated an
interim figure of 14.1 percent, and now proposes to make the
figure 20.4 percent of salary to be calculated on a so-called
*. u • 26dynamic normal cost basis.
In 1976 the Defense Department developed interim procedures
as agreed upon with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to
accommodate more effective implementation of OMB Circular A-7 6
in Commercial or Industrial Activities . These procedures include
DOD procuring activities' use of the "Firm Bid/Offer" concept
(also known as Firm Cost) . Developed and tested by the Air
Force, the "Firm Bid/Offer" provides for securing firm offers
from industry to perform commercial and industrial activities
by contract. The lowest responsive bid/offer received from a
responsible bidder/offeror will be used for comparison with
in-house costs to determine the method of operation which
will be least costly to the Government. This method should
thereby provide for more realism, accuracy and visibility con-
cerning the cost of providing goods or services in-house or
under contract with the private sector. Each solicitation
must contain an accurate statement of the workload requirement
which will also be used in developing inservice costs. A
Notice of Cost Comparison will be placed on the face of the
2 6
"Contract Services: OMB Proposes Significant Changes
to Application of A-76 Contract-Out Policy," Federal Contracts
Report, 11-21-77, pp. AA-1-2.
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solicitation document. The costs will be compared by the Gov-
ernment for three-year total for both an in-house operation
and the contractor cost of operation. The comparison will be
announced publicly to avoid accusations of unfair comparisons
resulting from adjustment of Government costs subsequent to
making public the contract cost. The contracting officer will
either cancel the solicitation or award a contract based
upon his comparisons, and all unsuccessful offerors will be
27
notified of the final determination.
OMB Circular A-76 defines the circumstances under which
the Government may provide commercial and industrial products
and services for its own use. Comparative cost analysis
must be used to support decisions involving the decision to
contract or accomplish work in-house. This also includes
compiling and maintaining an inventory of commercial or in-
dustrial activities, conducting triennial reviews of these
activities and evaluating "new starts" to determine if the
service can be obtained from commercial sources. There are
differences, however, in the amount of contracting functions
placed under the contract, and what comparisons are made to
determine whether work will be done in-house or by the con-
tractor among all the armed services. The Army and Navy
desire a decentralized approach to this cost comparison deci-
sion while the Air Force is more centrally controlled. The
27
"Contract Services: DOD to use "Firm Offer" Concept
in Interim Procedures for Implementing A-7 6 Within Agency,"
Federal Contracts Report, 11-8-76, p. A-19.
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Army and Navy make a cost comparison, the Navy decision being
final and the Army's decision being subject to audit by the
Army Audit Agency. If there is not an adverse impact on
the present work force, the Army's decision will be to con-
tract out. The Air Force's Air Staff selects the functions
for review and retains the decision-making authority. The
Army and Navy also estimate their own costs of doing in-house
work and often then make their own decisions of the con-
tractor's costs. The Air Force, on the other hand, estimates
the cost, solicits bids from qualified contractors and gives
the work to the lowest bidder, whether in-house or a contractor,
The Army and Navy assume that a contractor will do the job like
the Service involved, with the same organizational structure
and roughly the same number of people. This has the effect of
limiting the comparison mostly to employee pay and benefits
2 8
with the possibility of major determinants being omitted.
In November 1977 Acting OMB Director James T. Mclntyre
stated that the Government was to take a "middle ground ap-
proach" to implement the A-7 6 policy through a detailed set
of controls and procedures and recognize in doing cost com-
parisons that the Government has vested interests in certain
cases. These vested interests concerned present in-house
work and the premium price penalty to convert that activity
to a contract where federal workers are already at work on
28Defense Manpower: Keystone of National Security,




the job. Also, if the work is a "new start" with no federal
jobs at stake the Federal Government pays a relative price
penalty by initiating new work in-house. At this time OMB
proposed that each agency establish an A-7 6 appeal mechanism
to provide prompt and objective consideration of appeals
from A-7 6 decisions. The basis for the appelate procedure
is that unions contend decisions to contract out are based on
false projection of cost savings and the pressure of personnel
ceilings reductions. Industry feels that most decisions in-
volving A-7 6 are based on "empire building and desire to avoid
29
conflict with federal employee unions."
As of 17 April 1978 Les Fettig, Administrator of Federal
Procurement Policy, stated that an interagency group is working
to develop a cost handbook sufficiently detailed to produce
consistent results in all agencies. The handbook will utilize
DOD experience, call for firm bids or proposals to establish
commercial costs, more fully recognize Government costs both
in-house and by contract performance, and utilize independent
audits of cost estimates. The handbook is scheduled to be
ready in October 1978. Cost comparisons are to be weighted
to favor the "status quo." The existing activities will not
be converted to contractor operation unless that action produces
a savings of at least 10 percent of personnel-related costs.
29
"Contract Services: Federal Contracting Out System
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Contracts Report, 11-28-77, pp. A-6-11.
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A new start of a Government activity will not be approved
on the basis of costs unless the savings are at least 10
percent of personnel-related costs plus 25 percent of facility
30
and equipment costs.
Each agency is required to develop a schedule for the
review of all its commercial and industrial activities and
the contracting out of those similar functions. These figures
will be made available to the public. There will also be an
objective review of appeals from A-7 6 determinations as alluded
to in November 1977. The one area not intended for cost
analysis is research and development.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF SERVICE CONTRACTS
The policy of the Department of Defense is to make the
maximum use of the contract administration offices established
by the Military Departments under the Plant Cognizance Pro-
gram for the performance of the contract administration func-
tions outlined in ASPR 1-406. When field contract administra-
tion duties are not required or when special categories of
supplies or services are involved, the purchasing office may
retain responsibility for contract administration functions.
Field contract administration functions are primarily con-
cerned with those post-award/contract administration areas
^referred to as the communication function, receipt control,
"Contract Services: OFPP Solicits Congress 1 Support
in Managing A-7 6 Policy without Undue Restrictions," Federal





and inspection at destination. When the degree of post
award management attention is considered to be routine,
contract administration authorization is usually delegated
as is to a designated Defense Contract Administration Ser-
vices Management Area (DCASMA) or plant representative office.
Any special attention the procurement office considers is
32
necessary is usually based on the following factors:
1. Emphasis placed by the requiring or technical
activity.
2. Past experience of an unsatisfactory nature in
a previous procurement relative to the contractor, commodity
or the receiving activity.
3. The degree of contractor experience in commodity/
service being procured, particularly when a negative pre-award
has been issued.
4. Technical complexity of special contract provi-
sions relative to the item or service.
5. Relationship of the procurement to critical
programs or equipment.
6. The extent time elements are critical to insuring
completion of the contract .
7. The type of material or service: i.e., operational
conditions, when safety precautions are required for hazardous
material or conditions.
32 Navy Regional Procurement Office, Administration of




The goal is to insure that those involved in the perfor-
mance of a Government contract have a clear and mutual under-
standing of the scope of the contract, technical requirements,
and rights and obligations of the parties involved.
In these times of personnel restraints and dwindling
resources, the transfer of Administrative Contracting Officer's
functions to DCAS would seem like the answer to the individual
services' manpower problems. The principal reasons for using
33DCAS are as follows
:
1. Achieve uniformity in dealing with industry on
the administration of Government contracts.
2. Insure that only materials and services of the
required quality are accepted.
3. Insure that materials and services are provided
on time and at reasonable costs to procuring activities.
4. Perform much additional contract administration
tasks as may be requested by procuring activities and program
managers.
Personnel from a Navy field procurement office (Oakland,
CA) , the Naval Supply Systems Command (Washington, DC) , and
an Air Force procurement office (Wright-Patterson, OH) , in
discussions with this author, seemed reluctant to delegate
administrative functions to DCAS. The reasons cited were
as follows:
33 .The Procurement Team, Its Mission and Needs, Naval
Supply Center, Oakland, 24 November 1965, p. 29.
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i 1. A lack of adequate knowledge and understanding
of the procurement office's functions and specific programs.
This impairs communication from DCAS to the procurement office.
2. Timeliness of information from DCAS is sluggish.
Timeliness affects the quality of communications, and a sluggish
/System cannot be tolerated in today's environment.
3. DCAS does not become personally involved in the
procurement office's contracts. This lack of personal involve-
ment causes prodding by the procurement office in order to get
satisfactory contracts. The procurement office is concerned
with a quality product, and just not modifying delinquent
contracts.
4. DCAS personnel are poor. The military management
of DCAS frequently consists of military officers on their fi-
nal tours who provide little leadership, with subsequent poor
administration
.
In discussions with management officials and administra-
tive contracting officers of DCAS offices (Long Beach, CA,
Orlando, FL, and Los Angeles, CA) , a certain amount of reluc-
tance to administer service contracts was observed. Although
DCAS has the potential to expand its administration capabili-
ties by becoming actively involved in service contracting,
it would appear they desire not to do so.
The Navy and Air Force procurement offices who favored
in-house contract administration listed their major deficien-
cies in administering the contracts as follows:
1. Insufficient personnel resources
36

2. Personnel lack training in service contract
procedures
3. Inadequate surveillance procedures and stan-
dardization of this surveillance
4. Deficiency in the general understanding of
the scope of responsibility
5. Attitude concerning contractual procedures
coupled with increasing volume of workload inhibited atten-
tion to administrative detail
6. Inadequate documentation for audit trail
examination
7. Lack of conceptual safeguards and adequate
follow-through controls to insure fair and reasonable charges
for work performed under service contracts.
The actual areas of concern by the procurement offices
concerning service contracts reflect the following:
1. Material accountability and management
2. Labor classification and charges
3. Delivery order monitoring
4. Travel and per diem
5. BPA abuse
6. On-site job surveillance
7. Progress payments and invoicing
8. Communications among the contracting officer,
ordering officer, and contractor.
The Navy has set forth procedures to be utilized when
contract administration functions are retained by Navy pro-
curing contracting officers. The appointment of Contracting
37

Officer' s Technical Representatives (COTR) for proper
administration of service contracts represents the Navy's
panacea for the problems listed in the previous paragraphs.
Functions covered by the COTR concept include the following:
1. Issuance and administration of delivery orders
under indefinite delivery type (e.g. time and materials or
labor hour) contracts.
2. Issuance and administration of work assignments
or task orders under cost reimbursement type contracts.
3. Monitoring and progressing of contractors per-
formance as authorized under contracts, delivery orders or
task orders.
4. Inspection and acceptance or rejection of work
performed by the contractor.
5. Processing contractor invoices for payment by
the assigned paying office.
The COTR concept involves the procuring contracting
officer appointing ordering officers who must be qualified
to issue and administer delivery orders. When a delivery
order requires technical administration by other than the
procuring contracting officer or ordering officer, a COTR
will be appointed. Ordering officers are responsible for
assuring that copies of orders, modifications, backup informa-
tion, and related official correspondence are forwarded to
the procuring contracting officer for inclusion in the
contract file. COTRs are responsible for furnishing the
38

procuring contracting officer copies of the task order,
task order modifications, and the information required by
any letter of instruction the procuring contracting officer
issues to the COTR. As of the date of this thesis, the COTR
concept had not been implemented in any Navy procurement office.
In January 1976 the Air Force set forth procedures to be
utilized when contract administration functions are retained
by Air Force procuring contracting officers. The appointment
of Technical Representatives of the Contracting Officer (TRCO)
represented the Air Force panacea for the problems previously
listed in administration of service contracts in 197 6. The
objectives of the TRCO concept are to provide a systematic and
equitable review of the contractor ' s total performance through-
out the contract period. Responsibilities of the TRCO include
the following:
1. Assist the procuring contracting officer and
contract administrator with the technical aspects of adminis-
tering the contract.
2. Develop with the assistance of the contracting
officer and contract administrator, evaluation guides necessary
for proper surveillance of the contract.
3. Monitor the contractor's performance and promptly
notify the contracting officer, through the functional area
chief, of unacceptable performance.
4. Submit contractor performance reports to the
purchasing officer in the frequency, format, and detail
prescribed by the contracting officer. Coordinate these
39

reports with the contractor's authorized representative
when directed by the contracting officer.
5. Periodically review contractor performance
with the functional area chief and the contracting officer.
6. Accept the services performed by the contractor,
as specified by the contract. Prepare necessary certificates
or approvals certifying acceptable contractor performance.
7. Assist the functional area chief with preparation
of the statement of work, quality provisions, specifications,
and performance requirements in the purchase request and soli-
citation for reprocurement of services.
Procurement personnel from the Wright-Patterson base
procurement office stated that the TRCO concept had had mixed
results. These procurement personnel from the Wright-
Patterson base procurement office and Air Force officers
from Maxwell Air Force Base suggested a new approach to ad-
ministering service contracts was needed.
40

IV. ANALYSIS OF SERVICE CONTRACT PROBLEMS
If the Statement of Work is the vital cog in communicating
to potential contractors the Government's needs and in meas-
uring the contractor's performance, a new approach to design-
ing the Statement of Work must be developed.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF A STATEMENT OF WORK
The Work Scope, Statement of Work, Technical Require-
ment, or Specification are all terms used to state Government
requirements. Generally the Statement of Work is divided into
four major component groups: the essential requirements; the
method of adequately expressing the quality assurance and test
requirements; the technical data; and the management data to
be delivered under the contract. Industry has alleged that
work statements have become so complex that the contractor
cannot fully comprehend all the requirements the Government
desires. However, if the Statement of Work is not sufficiently
definitive, some contractors may not submit offers because
of uncertainty of the tasks involved, or conversely, feel in-
hibited by the purchaser because the work statement is too
34
restrictive. The detailed requirements set forth for the
services must place all potential contractors on a competitive
34
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basis. Its completeness and presentation provide procurement
35personnel with a control and represents its potential worth.
Failure to adequately describe the scope of the work will
result in needless delays and extra administrative effort
during the source selection process. Lack of clarity and
definition in the Statement of Work may cause valuable time
to be lost in obtaining additional information. Additionally,
contractors could be disqualified from the selection process
due to inadequate technical competence. Costly contingency
allowances or low quality and inventive proposals may also be
the unintentional results.
The development of the Statement of Work must be a team
effort with personnel from the functional area, the procure-
ment office, and manpower and/or management engineering. The
functional area chief, the team leader, must exercise authority
and responsibility for the service that will be under contract.
Functional people state the service to be delivered, measure
the quality of the service, and accept the service. Assisting
them is the procurement office which prepares the contract,
enforces its provisions, and provides necessary authority and
technical experience in contracting to make the contract a
workable document. The manpower and/or management engineering
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37 Boyett, LCOL Joseph E. and Major K. Gerken, "Structured
Analysis and Quality Assurance for Service Contracts," Air Force
Logistics Management: Center, 1978, pp. 1-14.
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The traditional method for defining requirements is to
write a process-oreinted Statement of Work. In essence, the
Government translated existing methods or processes into a
Statement of Work and the contractors were asked to provide a
service based on this statement. The problem for the Govern-
ment is to define and measure the quality of the contractor's
effort. Another approach, suggested by the Air Force, is to
design the Statement of Work on a systematic analysis of the
function to be performed; This procedure, called job analysis,
involves a step-by-step review of the requirements to arrive
at a specific output or services with associated standards of
performance. The contractor would integrate a system of people,
facilities, material, and the Government Statement of Work,




Job analysis includes a thorough analysis of each job's
inputs, process, and output functions. The steps in job
analysis are organization, tree diagram, activity analysis,
38Boyett, op. cit. , introduction.
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data gathering, performance values, governing directives,
and deduct analysis (discussed in next section) . In the
job analysis phase the services or outputs will become the
basis for writing a Statement of Work, developing standards,
defining performance indicators, and identifying acceptable
quality levels of performance. The service or services required
are linked together in a tree diagram breaking the services
into parts or subparts. Work analysis needs to be performed
to take each part of the tree diagram and break it into input,
work, and output. After the services that will be provided
under the contract are identified, then the workload and resource
data are gathered. This data provides the frequency by which
the output services are provided during the proposed contract
period. This workload data can be given to the bidders to in-
crease their understanding of the true requirements and for
later construction of a surveillance plan. The required re-
source data will include the physical assets and personnel
needed to perform the contract. Finally, performance values
must be determined so that each service provided by the contrac-
tor has an acceptable quality level. Performance values can
be obtained from historical records, managerial desires, or
imposed quality levels. Associated with each output will be
a performance indicator in order that the output can be mea-
sured. If indicators are not prescribed, the analyst must
decide along with the customer or management what indicators
would aid in measuring the process. Rates in terms of time,
distance, and cost are quite helpful. In any case try to
45

have the performance indicator quantifiable. Standards to
which the performance indicators are measured must be familiar,




Any regulatory guidance pertaining to the service must be
investigated. Most guidance is usually rather general at upper
echelons, and becomes detailed as it descends the chains of
command. A manager usually has numerous options as to the di-
rection he proceeds. The underlying principle is to be able
to understand the guidance.
The following illustrates the job analysis process. 40

















GOVERNMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE (B)
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The quality control loops (A) feed back information
from the output into the work process. The specified stan-
dards require the contractor to adjust performance if needed.
The Government quality assurance loop (B) determines the
41
acceptability.
C. WRITING THE STATEMENT OF WORK
Upon conclusion of the job analysis, the Statement of
Work is written stating the requirements, and the quality
assurance surveillance plan which complements the Statement
of Work. An overview of contract analysis steps are as follows
42(surveillance to be described later)
:
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When writing the requirements part of the Statement of
Work, it becomes necessary to identify the subject matter of
the procurement in great detail. The Statement of Work must










services, overall workmanship of items serviced, and provi-
sions for repair and maintenance over certain contractual
periods of time. A proper balance between cost and value
of quality must be specified. A large share of the require-
ments portion of the Statement of Work depends upon engineer-
ing and technical experience. Since the Government is re-
sponsible for writing the contract, the words written into
the Statement of Work must be able to be interpreted by
their exact meanings. If it is necessary to use words in
an abstract way, examples, illustrations, or definitions
should be included to further amplify what is desired. "Shall,"
"will," "any," "either," "and/or," and misusing pronouns is
to be avoided. Terminology must be consistent with abbrevia-
tions and acronyms held to a minimum or fully explained. A
successfully written Statement of Work reads well, is logical,
and can effectively communicate its intentions to the reader.





3. in accordance with the best commercial practice
4. good materials





10. free from impurities.
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D. QUALITY ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PLAN
A surveillance plan for service contracts is an organized,
planned approach to quality assurance as opposed to a simple
checklist method of surveillance. The surveillance plan's
goal is to determine if the service provided by the contractor
meets the quality standard. The four principal sources of
information for surveillance include management information
systems, random sampling, checklists, and formal customer com-
plaints. The basis for a surveillance plan comes from three
basic ideas: management by exception; performance indicators;
and problem location. Management by exception is the concern
shown when services are not adequately performed. The inspector
only takes action on problems. The Statement of Work contained
performance indicators; the level of contractor provided ser-
vices can be monitored by use of these performance indicators.
Problem location refers to decision tables used by the Quality
Assurance Evaluator (QAE) to find the problem's source and
44
show that the service is not being adequately performed .
A management information system will assist in surveil-
lance, if available, by collecting information on performance
indicators instead of random sampling data. Information can be
compared to a standard, judgment of performance made and then
acceptance or rejection of the performance. Random sampling
is the most common method used by the QAE to determine if
44 Boyett, LCOL Joseph E., op. cit., Chapter IV.
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performance is acceptable. MIL-STD-105D, "Sampling Procedures
and Tables for Inspection by Attributes," is the basis for per-
forming the random sampling. Since no surveillance list will
check all aspects of a contractor's performance, formal customer
complaints should be utilized to decide whether to step up the
level of inspection. The manner of documenting complaints
should be carefully planned by those people involved in check-
45mg the service contract.
A new procedure for handling formal customer complaints
needs to be established, and every organizational element should
be briefed and given a copy of an operating customer complaint
instruction. The instruction and briefing should include what
action can be expected from those assigned to monitoring the
service contract. The person monitoring contract performance
in the functional office should maintain a file on complaints.
46The record should contain at least the following information:
1. Date/time of complaint
2. Source of complaint-organization and individual
3. Nature of complaint (narrative description)
4. Contract reference of complaint related services
5. Valid complaint (yes/no)
6. Date contractor informed of complaint
7. Action taken by contractor






The job analysis phase in writing the Statement of Work
identified many performance indicators, however not all will
be critical to the services being provided. The analyst must
decide which performance indicators are critical and include
them in the surveillance plan. Criteria to be used must in-
clude the criticality of the process and associated output
service. and adaptability of the performance indicators to
overlap and check a variety of outputs. Part of the surveil-
lance plan recaps the information in the form of a surveil-
lance guide. The guide identifies the performance indicators,
critical quality levels, monitoring methods, frequencies of
monitoring method, and any appropriate decision tables that
may be used. The only thing remaining to do is the actual
surveillance. This consists of taking the surveillance plan
as written and using it. The random samples are made, sche-
dules of quality assurance inspections made, contractor dis-
47
crepancies documented and corrective action taken.
If any performance is determined to be unsatisfactory,
the contractor will be given a contract discrepancy report.
This contract report together with a tally or surveillance
checklist becomes the basis for payment or nonpayment or any
other actions the contracting officer deems necessary. Since
only the contracting officer can take formal action for un-
satisfactory contractor performance certain normal steps




be deficient by the QAE. The following are actions that can
usually be followed if the contractor's performance is less than
satisfactory
:
1. Usually the QAE will tell the contractor's site
manager of discrepancies the first time they occur. A nota-
tion will be made on the tally or surveillance checklist with
the date and time the deficiency was discovered and the date,
time, and name of the contractor's manager notification.
2. If the number of discrepancies found exceeds that
level for satisfactory performance, the QAE used the decision
tables in the Surveillance Plan to determine the cause or causes,
If the Government created any of the discrepancies, these will
not be counted against the contractor's performance. When the
Government has caused the contractor to perform in an unsatis-
factory manner, a letter must be written to the responsible
Government organization requesting corrective action be taken.
3. When the contractor exceeds the limits of un-
satisfactory performance, a contract discrepancy report (CDR)
will be issued to the contractor. The seriousness of the
failures should govern whether to issue the contract discre-
pancy report at the end of the month, or as soon as unsatis-
factory performance is indicated.
4. When a contract discrepancy report is issued
for a performance indicator, the contracting office must deduct
from the month's payment the amount indicated in the Perfor-
mance Requirement Summary Exhibit of the contract. If the
48
Ibid. , Chapter V.
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contractor takes appropriate corrective action to re-perform
those services which can be redone, by the end of the next
month or by a suspense date agreed to by the contracting offi-
cer, the deducted funds will be paid to the contractor. No
payment will be made for services that cannot be re-performed.
5. If the contractor does not achieve satisfactory
performance by the end of the next month or agreed suspense date,
another contract discrepancy report will be issued and the ap-
propriate amount deducted from the contractor's payment.
6. A third contract discrepancy report should be
the cause for consideration of a cure notice and possible ter-
mination of the contract. The contractor is given this notice
of his failure and an opportunity to cure the discrepancy within




Depending on the overall performance of the con-
tractor, an unsatisfactory reply to a cure notice should re-
quire a Show Cause notice to be issued. The Show Cause notice
in effect directs the contractor to show why he should not be
terminated for default. The Show Cause notice insures that
the contractor understands his predicament and his answer can




E. CURRENT ADMINISTRATION OF SERVICE CONTRACTS
The current Navy's policy to the administration of
service contracts lies in NAVSUPINST 4330.6 of 29 December
1977. This instruction "sets forth procedures to be utilized
in issuing orders under contracts, for appointment of Ordering
Officers, for appointment of Contracting Officer's Technical
Representatives (COTRs) , and for proper administration of
service contracts." The Navy recognizes that there is a wide
variance in contract administration practices among their field
activities and believes that this instruction will cure the
myriad of problems that now exist. Unfortunately since the y'T'
inception pf the COTR concept (see Chapter III) in December
1977, none of the Navy's field procurement offices have imple-
mented the new policy. The practical and successful appli-
cation of this concept appears dubious due to the reluctance
of procurement and technical personnel to properly implement
the concept, and the general confusion and lack of cooperation
between Navy systems commands.
The Air Force has had a similar approach to the Navy's
COTR concept. The Technical Representative of the Contracting
Office (TRCO) is implemented in the Air Force with varying
degrees of success. The general consensus received by this
author from procurement personnel at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base and Maxwell Air Force Base was that the TRCO con-
cept (see Chapter III) had gone as far as practicable in
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insuring proper contract administration for service contracts.
In looking for other possible approaches to the problem of
administration of service contracting the Air Force was con-
ducting research at their Air University and the Air Force
Logistics Command to attempt to overcome their past and present
problems. Considerable data was supplied to this author by
the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base regarding their
base level service contracts, for full food service, and audio-
visual contracts. The cogent factors of their new approaches
involve sampling per MIL-STD-105D, identifying key performance
indicators, and observing outputs vice input processes. The
observations drawn from their research is that they need fewer
personnel in the way of a TRCO or QAE to perform surveillance
(based upon a test contract currently in use) , and that they
(Air Force) must back-off and think like a contractor. It is
not possible to have the contractor perform in a manner ex-
pected by regulations, but according to the contractor's
methods and practices. The Statement of Work in the contract
is the job description for the in-service work. The procure-
ment office and the contractor must succeed in avoiding any
regulations that may be stumbling blocks to properly completing
the contract.
The new ideas fostered by the Air Force concerned military
management. To properly and successfully avoid possible pit-
falls made susceptible by regulations, a change in military
management policy is necessary. Military managers will be
required to think much more like a civilian director and rely
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strictly on successful service contract output. Some military
regulations may soon be required to be disestablished as con-




Based upon the research conducted and discussions with
the three major services, it is the author's opinion that the
Air Force becomes involved in detail procedures, the Navy
gives broad guidance in most areas and allows the buying or-
ganization to develop their own procedures, with the Army
somewhere between these approaches. There appears to be little
attempt to communicate with those responsible for similar func-
tions in other services. The same mistakes tend to be made
year after year despite all the guidance, procedures, papers,
studies, and seminars that have been conducted. Getting inno-
vative techniques into the procurement process generates re-
sistance, legal review, and more study.
Audit reports of the Naval Audit Service concerning ser-
vice contracting suggest a misunderstanding exists as to the
regulations that currently apply to service contracting, or
that procurement personnel knowingly circumvent them. Most
audit reports and controversies over service contracting sur-
round the employer-employee relationship. Research articles
suggested that this is not the fault of the written contract,
but of poor administration. This author's conclusion is that
it is the written contract with subsequent poor administration
that leads to the current controversies surrounding service
contracts. A properly written contract should entail a quality
assurance surveillance plan and administration procedures to
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be followed. Air Force procurement personnel stated that the
TRCO concept was only partially effective and was not a panacea
for administration of service contracts. There is no reason
to assume the Navy's COTR concept will be anymore successful
once implemented. Good administration of service contracts
involves a detailed surveillance plan in the contract, open
lines of communications between all parties to e. contract,
and a change from traditional military management policy. To-
day's administration of service contracts requires a departure
from military rules and regulations, and requires the Govern-
ment to become more output-oriented.
If considerable time is spent developing the Statement
of Work or by utilizing successful contracts from other or-
ganizations, many, if not most, of the problems with service
contracting should disappear. Effort is not being expended
on the development of the Statement of Work, and consequently
a quality assurance surveillance plan and proper administration
is poor or non-existent.
Service contracting has caused an accelerated growth in
workload in procurement offices. The effectiveness in total
job completion is seriously impacted by this workload increase.
Consequently, service contracting is now beginning to receive
a more equal share of emphasis from higher echelons of com-
mand as do the system and supply types of contracts.
Management flexibility is critical to successful transi-
tion from in-house to contracting out. The foreseeable rapid
expansion in service contracting is incompatible with the
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pressure from ceiling, grade, and hiring restrictions. Govern-
ment management must therefore remain flexible in regards to
personnel assignments and personnel availability if management
objectives are to be satisfied.
The Service Contract Act and OMB Circular A-7 6 can readily
be seen to be intertwined and progressively confusing. The
confusion over applicability of the Service Contract Act and
forthcoming interpretations must be followed closely by pro-
curement personnel in order to avoid mistakes of their own and
subsequent confusion to industry. The Department of Labor
has informally suggested to the Navy Supply Systems Command
that a contract including one service employee would be sub-
ject to the Service Contract Act. Unfortunately, as of this
date, nothing has been forthcoming on this matter and everyone
is left to "muddle" through. Applying the Service Contract
Act with this very liberal interpretation by the Department
of Labor will result in a substantial increase in costs. The
wage determination by the Department of Labor will drive up
drafting and technical typing labor costs, and indirectly all
other labor costs. Also anticipated are procurement delays
due to the process of obtaining wage determination from the
Department of Labor, as well as complaints from contractors
not previously subject to the Service Contract Act.
Today's administration of service contracts could justi-
fiably be considered poor. However, the military services are
attempting to foster fresh, innovative, and legal approaches
to administering service contracts. As more approaches are
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tested, researched, and funded, the administration of service





The following recommendations are offered as improve-
ments for the procurement of services as it relates to 0M3
Circular A-7 6, the Service Contract Act, and administration
of service contracts as it exists today at the field activity
level.
A. CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND STANDARDIZATION
A centralized management program should be developed
to determine procedures, determine the best type of contracts
to use, solve organizational staffing problems, and coordinate
actions among field activities and other military services, as
appropriate. More standardization could be achieved through
the guidance of centralized management. Since there are many
variations on the Statement of Work issued by field activities,
centralized management could insure that successful contracts
be available for distribution to other activities.
B. COORDINATION BETWEEN SERVICES
It is necessary in these days of dwindling personnel
resources that all military services cooperate, pool their
research, and share any information available concerning
service contracting both successful and unsuccessful. In
consonance with A. above, centralized management by a systems





Closely aligned with the previous recommendation, joint
research, joint conferences, and joint symposiums should be
held by the military services. Joint research on similar
service contracting problems should prevent "reinventing the
wheel."
D. TRAINING
Most of the training available for procurement personnel
regarding service contracting comes as a broad brush. Many of
the audits by the Naval Audit Service suggest that field pro-
curement personnel do not understand the proper procedures and
methods for administration of service contracts. It is therefore
suggested that field activities consider devoting some part of
the work day (possibly 3 0-60 minutes) to training on those
matters currently considered woefully deficient. Supervisory
and managerial personnel should be queried to determine whether
current programs, if any, in the procurement office are adequate
and useful. The management personnel of procurement offices
should emphasize self-study programs and/or the establishment
of their own training course.
E. AN APPROACH
Systematically developing the Statement of Work and
quality assurance surveillance plan is the means to successful
service contracting. There are many similar services that are
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currently being contracted at military installations. Systems
commands should designate test contracts be developed as models
for service-wide application. Teams, with corresponding re-
sponsibilities, can be established as explained in Chapter
IV of this thesis. Developing a Statement of Work on a sys-
tematic analysis of the function to be contracted by the pro-
cedure known as job analysis is the responsibility of desig-
nated teams at various installations. A step-by-step review
of the requirement to arrive at specific output services
with corresponding standards can be developed by any field
activity. Field activities across the country should be se-
lected to develop model contracts for particular services.
These model contracts can then be tested.
Results from the various model contracts tested and
found successful should be reviewed by a centralized manage-
ment group. Once approval by centralized management has been
completed, documentation begins. A data bank should then be
developed for successful service contracts. In the manner
of linear programming, critical variables should be identi-
fied for each service contract in the data bank. Other field
activities (besides the successful test facility) would have
the option of manipulating certain variables to fit local
conditions or situations without affecting the success of a
contract.
This approach to successful contracting by developing
test service contracts and making those successful contracts
available to field activities should provide contracting
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officers with a valuable tool. The ability to simply extract
successful contracts issued by any Department of Defense agency
and manipulate that contract to fit local conditions should
alleviate the present criticism surrounding service contracts.
In addition valuable hours should be saved by avoiding the
laborious effort of developing the Statement of Work and the
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan.
F. CONSIDERATION OF DCAS UTILIZATION
The military services need to consider greater participa-
tion by DCAS in administering service contracts. With the
proper development of a Statement of Work and a quality assur-
ance surveillance plan, DCAS has the potential to substantially






The total procurement dollars expended on service con-
tracts should continue to increase steadily. The develop-
ment of contractor-run services (particularly on bases and
posts) will necessitate different philosophies by the military
on policies previously handled in accordance with military
regulations. Systematically developing the Statement of Work
and quality assurance surveillance plan is the means to suc-
cessful service contracting. Correspondingly, military
management must begin to be concerned with the outputs, and
shy away from the contractor's inputs into the service.
The problems currently besetting the military services
in service contracting are not insurmountable. By coordinating
the efforts of the military services, centrally managing the
process, and utilizing the best solutions available, the suc-
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